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Abstract. Franchisors in Britain face a difficult problem. If they use the techniques of reputation risk management 
to protect their corporate brands (which is usually their most valuable assets), they may inadvertently increase their 
exposure to third party tort claims. This paper explains why this may occur and how the franchisor could try to do 
to deal with this problem. It shall be suggested that a form of reputation risk management should be adopted by 
franchisors, even where the tort risk remains. This is because the franchisor has much to gain from having an 
efficient method of protecting the corporate brand where appropriate legal and organisational arrangements can be 
made to further this goal.  




The main purpose of this article is to examine a difficult problem faced by franchisors. If the franchisor attempts 
use the techniques of reputation risk management to protect its corporate brand (which is usually its most valuable 
asset), the franchisor may inadvertently increase their exposure to third party tort claims. This is because of the 
unusual structure of the franchised business and the problems of implementing a risk management system within 
this structure.  
Although the franchised business has the appearance of a single business entity because it operates a chain 
of outlets under the same name and delivers the same, standardised, quality-assured, product and/or service, it is 
not one. Many of the franchised outlets are, in fact, small to medium-sized independent businesses linked together 
by contract with the franchisor. These businesses derive their corporate identity and working methods from 
intellectual property rights that are licensed to them by the franchisor. The franchisor therefore, does not have the 
normal, “command and control” power over its franchisees, which the management in many conventional 
organisations have over their employees. Therefore, the implementation and enforcement of a reputation risk 
management system to protect the franchisor’s corporate brand is not as straightforward as it might be for 
companies with normal management structures. In addition, the franchisees have a degree of autonomy over how 
the run their businesses and they may resist the imposition of potentially costly risk management procedures by 
the franchisor. If the franchisor imposes a reputation risk management system on the franchisees, there may be 
problems over compliance and enforcement. The imposition of such a system may at the same time increase the 
scope of the franchisor’s tortious liability.  
Normally, franchisors are in a favourable position in relation to tort claims. In British law, there is a fairly 
clear legal boundary between the franchisor and the franchisee because they contract at arms-length to operate the 
franchise. This means that if a third party suffers harm as a result of the franchisee’s negligence the injured person 
would have a claim against the franchisee as an independent contractor. The franchisor would not normally be 
involved. However, the franchisor’s protection from such tort claims could be undermined if the franchisor 
introduces a reputation risk management system. Reputation risk management would require the franchisor to 
exercise greater influence and control over the network than has been the case in the past. One important 
consequence of this could be to strengthen the claims of third parties against the franchisor under the principles of 
vicarious liability. This could produce a paradoxical result for the franchisor. In its attempts to control the business 
risk of damage to its reputation, the franchisor may be inadvertently increasing the scope of its legal risk.  
This article shall examine this problem. It shall be suggested in the course of the analysis that a form of 
reputation risk management should be adopted by franchisors, even where the tort risk remains. This is because 
the franchisor has much to gain from using a modern and efficient method of protecting the corporate brand if 
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2. The value and the vulnerability of franchised brands 
 
Most franchised businesses are built upon the concept of the brand 1 and the value of the brand to these businesses 
can be significant proportion of the total value of the company2 .Indeed, in some cases the value of the brand may 
be the single most valuable company asset. In the case of the very large franchised businesses the brand value can 
be worth billions of dollars. In a recent survey of the top 100 brands in the world, the brand value of McDonald’s 
was approximately $26 billion, the KFC (Kentucky Fried Chicken) brand and the Pizza Hut brand were worth 
approximately $5 billion, the Hertz car rental franchise brand was worth approximately $3.5 billion, and the 
Starbucks coffee shop franchise was worth $2.5 billion3. The world’s top brand, as listed by the Interbrand 
Corporation, the brand consultancy, is a franchised business. It is Coca-Cola, which, like its soft drink rival Pepsi, 
franchises it bottling operations (Felstead, 1993: 38). According to Interbrand, Coca-Cola’s brand value was $67.5 
billion, while Pepsi’s brand value was worth $12.4 billion. 
Although many of the largest franchised brands are immensely valuable, they can also be surprisingly 
vulnerable. In the twenty-first century it is becoming harder to protect the brands from damaging publicity. For 
example, if a franchised business were to make a mistake that harmed human health or safety this would be 
quickly disseminated over the Internet and the 24-hour news channels leaving the business with very little time to 
investigate the cause of the accident or to respond to its critics. Under these conditions, the corporate reputation 
may suffer and sales may decline without the full facts of the case being properly investigated. When so much of 
the value of a franchised business is tied up in an intangible asset that could be affected by bad publicity, 
franchisors have an incentive to seek new ways to protect their brands. But this is not a straightforward matter 
because of the peculiar legal structure of the franchised business (examined below).  
 
2.1 The Coke Products Case 
 
Franchised brands can be damaged by the acts and omissions of the franchisor, but also potentially by the acts or 
omissions of thousands of local franchisees. It is true that in the case of the franchisees, the franchisors are able to 
set the standards of performance for the brand, but these standards have to be implemented properly by the 
franchisees to be effective. Normally most franchisees will run their businesses according to the standards set for 
the brand (for example, in terms of fast and friendly service, the quality of the product, clean premises, good 
hygiene, etc). However, because franchisees (as independent business people who have put capital into their 
enterprises) tend not to be monitored as closely as employee-managers running branch operations in a typical, 
hierarchical, unified corporate structure, there may be a greater chance for things to go wrong at the local level that 
could have a negative impact on the brand.4 Furthermore, franchisors are reluctant to become too closely 
associated with the day-to-day operations of the franchisees’ businesses because they fear the legal threat of being 
held vicariously liable for the defaults of their franchisees (Abell, 1989:90): So the risk to the reputation of the 
franchised brand can be significant.  
Indeed, there have been cases where the acts or omissions of a local franchisee in one country have had a 
wider negative impact on the brand. For example, in 1999, the Coke brand was damaged in an incident involving 
                                                          
1 A brand is a trade name used to identify a product or service. It serves to distinguish the goods or services of the 
owner from those of his competitors. Producers believe that if the invest in the quality of their brands they will 
build up a brand image to which consumers will respond by asking for the goods by their brand name. Customers 
may also be prepared to pay a premium for the branded product. See Issacs, A.  (2003) “The Oxford Dictionary of 
Business, Oxford OUP, 43-44 
2 See Magid, J. M., Cox, A. D. and Cox, D.S. “Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of Trademark 
Dilution”, American Business Law Journal (Volume 43) 1 at pages 8-9. In early 2002, the Coca-Cola Company 
had a market capitalization of $127.4 billion, while the book value of its tangible assets was only $8.8 billion. 
Thus over 90% of the company's value (nearly $120 billion) could be attributed to intangible assets. While Coca-
Cola has a variety of intangible assets (e.g., trade secrets, exclusive distribution contracts), most valuation experts 
consider the bulk of its value to be its dozens of brands and trademarks. 
3 These are the most recent figures produced by the Interbrand Corp survey of “The 100 Top Brands” as published 
in “Business Week” in July 2005, available at 
http://www.ourfishbowl.com/images/surveys/best_global_brands_2005.pdf 
4 Franchisors have to be careful how they deal with the franchisees. Heavy-handed supervision might alienate the 
franchisee and may cause him to leave the franchise. On the other hand, the franchisor has to be sure that the brand 
will not be damaged by franchisees failing to meet the set standards for service, quality and cleanliness, etc. 
Therefore, franchisor will inspect the performance of the franchisees in various ways (e.g. by field visits, by 
“mystery shoppers” who anonymously evaluate the outlet, etc). However, the emphasis is on creating incentives 
for the franchisee to perform effectively, so that self-control can largely replace external control. See Murray, I. 
(2003) “How to choose a Franchise” London, Kogan Page Ltd, 141-146 
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120 people in Belgium and 80 people in France who felt ill after drinking Coke. This temporary illness was 
attributed to the production operations of the Belgian and French franchisees and was not caused by an act of the 
brand-owning franchisor, Coca-Cola of Atlanta, Georgia, USA.  
On investigation of this incident, it was discovered that the contamination of the Belgian-produced drinks 
was caused by some defective carbon dioxide being used in a small supply of bottles in the plant of the franchisee 
in Antwerp. Meanwhile, in France the source of the contamination arose from a fungicide that was used by the 
franchisee in Dunkirk to spay on wooden pallets. Yet because Coca-Cola management did not intervene either 
early enough or decisively enough during these crises to allay public concerns, the national media in France and 
Belgium could justifiably inflame public outrage in these countries. This public outrage led to an unofficial 
boycott of all Coke-branded drinks and ultimately to a public demand for a total product recall.  
The Governments of France and Belgium succumbed to this public pressure (even when it became clear 
that there was no threat to public health) and they ordered a total product recall. This recall cost Coca-Cola $103 
million. Coke’s profits subsequently dropped by 31% in these countries and the franchisor had to spend substantial 
sums in a promotion campaign to restore public confidence in the product (Larkin, 2003). Risk management 
experts have argued that if a crisis management system (as described below) had been in place in Coca Cola as 
part of a reputation risk management scheme, the impact on the franchisor’s brand could have been much less.  
                However, damaging bad publicity is not only generated by unfortunate incidents like those occurring in 
Belgium and France; it is sometimes created by campaigning groups as a way of bringing pressure to bear on 
franchisors to change their business practices and to galvanise the politicians into making laws to curb the alleged 
bad practices of business. Environmentalists, trade unionists and anti-corporate activists have all found something 
to object to in the way certain franchises conduct their businesses. In the case of McDonald’s for example, various 
groups have attacked the reputation of the business by alleging (amongst other things) that it was selling food that 
may cause obesity; that it was targeting their advertising at children; that it was exploiting its workforce; that it 
was contributing to the suffering and exploitation of animals, and that it was adding to the environmental problems 
by producing packaging waste5 .  
                  Yet whatever faults are to be found in franchised businesses, they are certainly not the “worse 
offenders” in the corporate world in terms of alleged breaches of social and environmental responsibilities. These 
businesses become targets for other reasons. For anti-globalisation and anti-corporate activists the large franchised 
brands are conspicuous examples of the global capitalist system. By bringing pressure to bear on them through a 
sustained attack on the brands, the campaigners hope to persuade other companies to change their business 
practices to avoid the same treatment.6 Franchisors are therefore keen to implement risk management systems that 
will help to protect their valuable reputations from the various threats described above. 
 
3. The management of the risks to reputation 
 
Risk management consultants have identified some of the main reasons why companies have found themselves in 
crisis situations where their corporate reputations are seriously at risk. These companies had no effective plans in 
place to manage the threats to the company’s reputation from the damaging incidents that occurred. In many cases 
the incident that damaged the reputation of the company happened because the company’s decision-makers did not 
know what was going in the lower levels of the organisation. This is a problem that is made more difficult to solve 
as a company grows in size and complexity and may be particularly acute in the case of franchised networks 
where the franchisees enjoy a degree of autonomy.  
When the damaging incidents occurred, the managers of these companies simply dealt with the problem as 
it arose without the benefit of effective forward planning. This perhaps explains why, to some extent, the 
companies’ responses to these crises were so poor. This reactive management may no longer be a sensible 
response strategy. As Neef (2003: p vii) has pointed out “in many ways companies have a lot more to lose today 
than even ten years ago, simply because the potential for being caught and exposed, by activists, lawyers… 
government agencies and the media, is greater [now] than ever before”. Therefore, companies need to be 
                                                          
5 The defendants, Steel and Morris, made a number of these allegations about McDonald’s in the so-called 
McLibel trial. See Vick, D.W. & Campbell, K. (2001) “Public Protests, Private Lawsuits, and the Market: The 
Investor Response to the McLibel Case”, Journal of Law and Society, Volume 28, (Number 2) 211-218 
6 McIntosh, M. & Leipziger, D. (1998) “Corporate Citizenship” London, Financial Times/Pitman Publishers, 257. 
The authors note that: “campaigners tend to target not the worse companies, but those that are most well 
known…McDonald’s being among the most well-known fast food chains, is always vulnerable. Targeting an 
industry leader puts the whole industry on warning. Companies like McDonald’s make good pressure points 
because they are industry leaders, because they have solid brands with a global identification and because people 
expect more from them”. 
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proactive. This entails identifying, analysing and implementing solutions to the foreseeable problems that may 
arise. 
 
3.1 The basic principles of reputation risk management 
 
There are a number of risk management specialists, who have written books on the subject, setting out various 
frameworks for reputation risk management (Sheldon Green, 1992; Jolly, 2001; Davies, 2002; Neef, 2003; Larkin, 
2003; Fishkin, 2006). These vary in their details, but an overall pattern of recommendations does emerge which 
could be regarded as a common core of the subject. All recognise that reputation is built upon perception and that 
perception is vulnerable to real and imaginary threats (Larkin, 2003: 86-120). The goal of a reputation risk 
management system is to identify and prevent the avoidable threats and control and minimise the unavoidable 
threats.  
The first essential step in creating a risk management system is to create a team of managers with the task 
of focusing on risk management and prevention. This coordinating team needs to have the full backing of the 
board so that it has power within the organisation to impose the controls necessary to achieve their goals. The first 
task of these risk managers is to identify the threats to the company’s reputation from within the organisation and 
from outside the organisation. They then have to assess those risks by estimating their probability and their likely 
effect on the organisation’s good name.  
Clearly, the threats that are very likely to occur and are very likely to cause grave damage to the 
organisation are the ones that must be eliminated or at least minimised as a priority. Risk avoidance and reduction 
methods must be put in place for the other perceived threats to the company’s reputation, especially for the low 
probability but high cost threats that could cause a crisis for the company. This usually involves further training 
for employees and the promotion of a culture where problems in the business can be reported without the 
employees having to fear for their jobs or promotion prospects within the company. The risk management experts 
also seem to agree that the reputation risk management procedures should be accommodated within the company’s 
wider risk management programmes 7 as it may be complementary to, and overlap with other risk management 
systems, such as financial risk management, health and safety risk management and the requirements of the 
Turnbull Report on the management of internal risks as part of the obligations of the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance, as amended 2005.8 
Finally, the various authors suggest the creation of a detailed crisis management procedure so that if the 
worst-case scenario happens, it can be dealt with efficaciously. So, for example, there should be an identifiable 
spokesperson ready to answer questions from the media or regulators about the crisis. There should be a system 
for briefing all relevant top personnel about the problems and alerting a “trouble-shooting” team. This trouble-
shooting team should find out and report on the causes of the problem and the measures that may be necessary to 
eliminate it, or at least minimise the damage that the problem has caused. There would seem to be a consensus 
among the reputation risk management specialists that if a crisis were to emerge the preservation of the company’s 
reputation will depend upon how the company is perceived to have managed the problem. This may depend upon 
the extent to which the company is perceived to have taken full and reasonable precautions to guard against the 
circumstances which threaten it; how effective the company has been in reacting to and minimising the damage 
caused to the public, and how far the company is seen to be genuinely concerned about what has happened at a 
level beyond that of purely business considerations (Sheldon Green, 1992: 171). 
 
4. Legal implications of reputation risk management techniques for franchisors 
 
In the franchised system, the franchisees operate as separate businesses and have a degree of autonomy over how 
the run their outlets, within the parameters set by the franchise agreement. Franchisors use this structure to limit 
the possibility of claims being made against them by victims of wrongs committed by the franchisees. The 
                                                          
7 See Larkin op cit pages 20 -21 and Sheldon-Green op cit, Chapter 4 “The Bottom Line of Reputation Risk 
Management”. In this chapter Sheldon-Green presents a financial case for adopting reputation risk management 
and one of his points is that a reasonable percentage of the cost of this programme is already in place because of 
the overlap between the management of reputation risk and the management of other types of risks in the 
company. 
8 The Turnbull Report sets out the best practice for the internal control of risk and was fist published in 1999. It 
has now been amended. The directors of listed companies are now required to confirm in the annual report that 
they have dealt with (or are planning to deal with) any significant failings or weaknesses highlighted by the 
internal control system. For the new guidance see the “Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code” available at www.frc.org.uk/corporate/internalcontrol.cfm 
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franchise agreement will make it clear that the franchisees are to be regarded as independent contractors 9  and to 
encourage these victims to pursue the franchisee the franchisors will usually ensure that the franchisees has the 
appropriate level of public liability and other types of insurance. This means that when a franchisee commits a 
wrong, there should be insurance money available to satisfy the claim of the victim.  
However, this system does not offer complete immunity to the franchisor. There have been occasions 
where franchisors have been found to be liable vicariously to third parties. These cases have arisen because the 
culpable franchisee had no suitable insurance cover or was under-insured. In these circumstances the injured party 
has had to resort to the “deep pockets” of the franchisor through the mechanism of vicarious liability in order to 
receive full compensation for the harm done by the franchised business.  
In many of these vicarious liability cases, a decisive factor in establishing franchisor liability has been the 
degree of control exerted by the franchisor over the operations of the franchisees. This is a source of concern for 
any franchisor wishing to implement a reputation risk management system because such a system requires the 
franchisor to exercise a greater degree of control than had been the case previously. Unfortunately, the greater the 
degree of control that the franchisor exerts over the franchise network, the greater is the risk of vicarious liability 
being established against these franchisors. 
 
5. Under what circumstances might a franchisor be held vicariously liable for the wrongs of the franchisee?  
 
The law gives considerable scope to businesses to structure their agreements in order to reduce or minimise legal 
risks10 . By contractual devices and by careful commercial arrangements regarding the operational control of the 
franchise, the franchisor might be able to prevent the principle of vicarious liability from applying (Collins, 1990, 
731).  
However, if the victim is to succeed in bringing a claim against the franchisor on the basis of vicarious 
liability, the victim must establish a nexus between the franchisor and the franchisee sufficient to justify the 
imposition of this special form of tortious liability. If the victim can show that the franchisor exercised a 
sufficiently high degree of influence or control over the franchisee to the extent that the franchisee's wrongs can be 
fairly ascribed to the franchisor, then the victim may have a case against the franchisor. Such a nexus may be 
established if the victim can show that the relationship between the franchisor and franchisee is analogous to that 
of the law on master and servant, or to that of principal and agent. However, to keep this article within the word 
limit only the master and servant issue will be examined. 
 
 
5.1 The analogy of master-servant relationship 
 
Over the years the British courts have developed three main tests to determine whether or not a master-servant 
relationship exists between two persons. These are the control test, the organisation test and the “multiple test”. 
Under the classic formulation of the control test by Bramwell LJ in Yewens v Noakes, a "servant is a person 
who is subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which he shall do his work”11. Therefore, where 
one company can instruct another person on what to do and how to do it, this may be sufficient to establish the 
existence of a master-servant relationship. If the franchisee's wrongdoing were within the scope of his 
“employment", a sufficient nexus would exist to make the franchisor vicariously liable to the third party for that 
wrong12. An arguable case can be made that many franchisees are subject to a sufficiently high degree of 
                                                          
9  The contractual draftsmen will have made it clear by a number of devices that the two parties to the contractual 
agreement are separate and independent persons. These include the use of clauses declaring the franchise 
agreement is not a joint venture or a principal-agent relationship. Commercial practices will also be scrutinised by 
the franchisor's legal advisers so that the operation of the agreement will not give rise to an inference of franchisor 
control sufficient to bring the doctrine of vicarious liability into play. See Mendelsohn, M. (2004) “Franchising 
Law” (second edition) Richmond, Richmond Tax & Law Ltd, p123-124 
10 Perhaps this fact can best be illustrated by the vivid judgement of Templeman LJ in a leading case on the nature 
of corporate liability." English company law possesses some curious features, which may generate some curious 
results. A parent company may spawn a number of subsidiary companies, all controlled directly or indirectly by 
the shareholders of the parent company. If one of the subsidiary companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to 
be the runt of the litter and declines into insolvency to the dismay of its creditors, the parent company and the 
other subsidiary companies may prosper to the joy of the shareholders without any liability for the debts of the 
insolvent subsidiary." per Templeman LJ, Re Southard & Co Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1198 at p. 1208. 
11 (1880) 6 QBD 530 
12 The principle of the employer being vicariously liable for his employee’s tort committed within the scope of his 
employment is well established in Employment Law. See for example, the case of Mersey Docks & Harbour 
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franchisor control to satisfy the application of the control test to modern circumstances. In modern times, the 
subordination of the franchisee is not to the direct, personal command of the franchisor, but rather to the rules of 
the franchisor's bureaucratic system. Most business-format franchises function by making the franchisees follow 
the detailed procedures set out in the operations manual13. These manuals are issued to each franchisee to ensure 
uniformity of product, process or service. The operations manual may specify the opening and closing hours of the 
franchisee's business, when he can take his holidays, how he should record his accounts, how he should decorate 
his premises and how he should dress his staff (Mendelsohn, 1999: 67). A failure to follow the instructions set out 
in the manual is usually treated as a breach of contract by the franchisor (Felstead 1993:117).  
Further examples of the franchisee's subordination to the will of the franchisor may be found in the terms of 
the franchise agreement (Adams & Prichard-Jones, 1997: 357-388). In this contract the franchisor may determine 
the sales targets of the franchisee's business as well as what the recommended retail price for the product or 
service should be. Usually, the franchisee is obliged by a contractual term to share his gross revenues with the 
franchisor by way of royalty payments (Barrow & Golzen 1994: 70-71) and it is often the case that the franchisee 
is restricted to buy his supplies from the franchisor by a term in the franchise contract. Thus, the contract and the 
manual may be the manifestations of control. 
The organisation test was created to deal with the problem of persons who appear to be independent of the 
employer because they are not closely monitored or controlled by the employer but are, nonetheless, essential to 
the operation of the business. In Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison v MacDonald & Evans, Lord Denning stated the 
control test does not cover every situation. He explained that, "it is often quite easy to recognise a contract of 
service when you see it, but very difficult to say wherein the difference lies. A ship's master, a chauffeur and a 
reporter on the staff of a newspaper are all employed under a contract of service; but a ship's pilot, a taxi-man and 
a newspaper contributor are employed under a contract for services [i.e. self-employed]. One feature which seems 
to me to run through the instances is that, under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business 
and his work is done as an integral part of the business: whereas under a contract for services his work, although 
done for the business, is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it"14 . Reasoning by analogy it could be 
argued that although the franchisee carries out his work without the close supervision of the franchisor, he is 
nevertheless performing a function that could be viewed as integral to the franchisor's business15 .  
 
5.2 The “multiple test” 
 
The third test is the “multiple test”. This is the most sophisticated test of the three. It covers the situation where the 
various factors that constitute the parties’ relationship seem to contain contradictory elements. Some elements may 
point to the independence of the worker, while other elements in the agreement point to the existence of a master-
servant relationship16. This test, when applied to the franchise agreement, would involve the courts considering 
and then weighing up a number of different factors governing the relationship between the franchisor and the 
franchisee. Factors which may incline the court towards the view that the relationship is one of employer-
independent contractor may include the following: the fact that the person invested his own capital in the business 
(which is something all franchisees do); the fact that he hires his own workers, uses his own equipment and pays 
his own income tax and National Insurance contributions, etc. 17. These factors tend to be present in the typical 
franchise arrangement and would seem to support the franchisor's contention that it should not be held vicariously 
liable for the torts of an independent franchisee. 
However, the issue is not clear-cut. There are other factors that exist within the franchise relationship that 
indicate it might be more like an employment relationship. These factors would include the following: firstly, the 
fact that the franchisee is normally dependent upon the franchisor's managerial and operational knowledge to run 
the business. Secondly, that the franchisee is expected to follow the operational instructions set down in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Board v Coggins and Griffith [1947] AC 1 HL. The concept of the scope of employment has been developed in 
cases such as, Kay v ITW [1968] 1 QB 140, CA; and Rose v Plenty [1975] ICR 430. 
13  For an example of the breadth and depth of control that the franchisor may exert through the operations manual, 
see A. Feldstead, op cit p118, especially where the author describes how Mc Donald’s, the fast food franchise 
issues a 600 page manual of rules and regulations to its franchisees. 
14 [1957] 1 TLR 101 (Denning LJ) 
15 Using Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1951] 2 KB 343 as an analogy for this proposition 
16  This difficulty was recognised by Lord Wright in Young v Montreal Locomotive Works [1947] 1 DLR 161 
at169 where he said, “In many cases the question can only be settled by examining the whole of the various 
elements which constitute the relationship between the parties”. 
17 Barrow, C. and Golzen G: (1994) “A Guide to Taking Up a Franchise”, London, Kogan Page, p40 where the 
authors point out that,” some contracts state that [the operations manual's] status is paramount over anything said 
in the agreement". 
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Operations Manual (the document that is normally issued to franchisees at the outset of the franchise)18 . Thirdly, 
that the franchisor normally ensures that the franchisee adheres to the instruction as set out in the manual by 
reserving the right to carry out inspections of the franchisee's business to monitor compliance. A failure to follow 
the instruction manual is usually treated as a breach of contract. 
There has been a franchise case in the UK where this “multiple test” has been employed. This was the case 
of Ready Mix Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance19. In this case the company dismissed its 
drivers, sold all its trucks to them and then re-employed them as "independent contractors" (franchisees). The 
contract specified that the drivers were to wear the company's uniforms, place their trucks at the company's 
disposal for a certain number of hours and obey orders from the company's foreman. The drivers were expected to 
pay their own tax and National Insurance, maintain their vehicles and pay all the running costs, and hire substitute 
drivers if and when necessary, to fulfil the Ready Mix contract. MacKenna, LJ held that the drivers were 
independent workers (outside the provisions of s1 (2) of the National Insurance Act 1965). In his judgement he 
noted that the obligation to do work subject to the employer's (franchisor's) control was not always a sufficient 
condition of a contract of service if other provisions of the contract were inconsistent with it20. The fact that the 
drivers owned their vehicles, bore the financial risk and had the power to hire substitute drivers confirmed their 
status as independent workers (franchisees). 
It would seem therefore that the franchisor could resist the claims of a victim of a wrong on the basis of this 
case. However, it must be borne in mind that this case only concerned the relationship between the franchisor and 
franchisee between themselves for the purposes of allocating liability for National Insurance payments to the State. 
The case did not concern third party rights. Where third party rights have been at stake under the law of tort, the 
cases show that the courts are influenced by different considerations. Under English Law primacy tends to be 
afforded to the interests of the tort victim who needs to find a defendant with adequate resources to meet the 
compensation claim.21 Thus, if the tortious act by the worker/ franchisee occurred within the scope of his or her 
employment, or for the purposes of the employer's business, that will normally be enough to settle liability on the 
employer/franchisor. As Selwyn (2004: p269) notes, "in recent years the courts appear to be gradually extending 
this principle of legal liability, and to that extent the distinction between an independent contractor and an 
employee is becoming possibly less important than before". 
 
6. Vicarious liability of the franchisor: the American experience 
 
Unlike other countries, franchising in the UK is not subject to special legislation22. Despite the size of franchise 
networks and their impact on jobs and the economy in Britain 23 , there is relatively little case law on the specific 
issue of franchising, particularly concerning third party rights under tort. For this reason it may be instructive to 
look at a common law jurisdiction where franchising has been a frequent issue in litigation, in order to estimate 
how the problem of torts committed within franchised networks may be handled in this country. The obvious place 
to look is America. This is so for two main reasons. Firstly, because the Americans developed the concept of 
business format franchising that is now used throughout the world24 and secondly, because third party actions 
against the franchisor for the wrongs of the franchisee has been much more common occurrence there than 
anywhere else in the common law world.   
 
                                                          
18  [18] Felstead, op cit, p116-121 
19 [1968] 2 QB 497 
20 Lord Justice MacKenna in the case of Ready Mix Concrete v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance set 
out a three- point test to determine whether or not there was a contract of service between the parties, at p515. 
21 See Selwyn, N. (2004) “Employment Law” London, LexisNexis UK at p269-270.  Selwyn gives the traditional 
reasons for vicarious liability being imposed. He explains that the employer, having initiated or created the 
situation where the employee has been in a position to cause harm, should properly bear the loss. The second 
reason he gives is that employee will usually be unable to meet any substantial claim for damages, whereas the 
employer will normally have the financial resources to provide compensation, or at least will be insured against 
such contingencies. 
22 The subject matter of this legislation is to ensure that the franchisor discloses all the necessary information about 
the franchise to prospective franchisees. The legislation is not concerned with third party rights. The countries that 
have disclosure laws include the USA, Alberta and Quebec in Canada and France. See Adams op cit p323 to 326 
23 A survey carried out on behalf of the Franchise Association for 1999 found that franchising had an annual 
turnover of £57.9 billion and employed 316,900 people directly in the UK. 
24 See Felstead op cit p39 for the origins of franchising. Although he traces the origins of franchising back to the 
Middle Ages in Europe, he identifies the origins of corporate franchising and the business format form of 
franchising to America. 
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6.1 The use of the employment analogy in America 
 
To impose vicarious liability on the franchisor, the American courts have accepted the franchisor -franchisee 
relationship may be analogous to the master-servant relationship of employment law. One of the earliest cases to 
establish this principle occurred in a dispute concerning a petrol station franchise. This type of franchise was 
granted to an individual operator, called Schneider, by an oil company in the case of Humble Oil &Refining Co. v 
Martin. 25 
In 1949, the Humble Oil Company was found vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of its 
servant/franchisee when third parties were injured by the negligence of the petrol station staff. The facts were, 
briefly, these. Mrs. Love was told by garage staff to leave her car in the driveway of the garage. The garage staff 
said to her that they would move it from there to the workshop for repair. But they acted negligently when they 
failed to check that the hand break of the car was fully on, or that the gears were engaged. They were also 
negligent in leaving the car unattended for some time on an incline in the garage's driveway. The car rolled back 
down this hill on to the road, where it picked up momentum and crashed into a garden striking Mr. Martin and his 
two young daughters from behind just as they were walking up their garden path to their front door.  
In its defence, the Oil Company contended that it was not liable for the injury to the Martin family because 
the franchisee of the petrol station was an independent contractor. To support its case, the Oil Company pointed to 
a term in the franchise agreement that clearly identified the franchisee as an "independent contractor". The 
Company also established that the franchisee believed himself to be an independent businessman and that the staff 
of the garage considered themselves to be employees of the franchisee (who dictated their terms of employment 
and paid their wages), and not employees of the oil company.  
The Texas appeal court accepted that there were indeed elements in this franchise agreement that seemed to 
support the appellant's case, but the court also noted that there were other elements in the agreement, which would 
indicate the existence of a master and servant relationship. What tipped the balance in favour of the respondents 
was the evidence of the degree of control that the Oil Company actually exerted over the franchisee. The franchise 
agreement demanded that the franchisee, "make reports and perform other duties in connection with the said 
station that may be required of him from time to time by the Company". The agreement gave the Oil Company the 
power to dictate the franchisee's hours of work, as well as the type of products he could sell at the service station. 
In addition, it was established that the Humble Oil Company provided all the important station equipment and was 
the legal owner of the garage premises. It also paid a substantial part of the operating costs of the garage. The 
franchisee merely leased the petrol station from the Oil Company. Indeed, the court found that the only real area of 
discretion that the franchisee had was in the hiring and firing of petrol station staff.  
 The court concluded that: "all in all, aside from the stipulations regarding [the franchisee] Schneider's 
assistants, there is essentially little difference between his situation and that of a mere store clerk. Schneider was 
Humble Oil’s servant and so accordingly were Schneider's assistants who were contemplated by the [franchise] 
contract" (Klein & Ramseyer, 1997: 14). This extensive operational control exerted by the Oil Company over the 
franchisee's business justified the court’s finding that the Oil Company was vicariously liable to the Martin family. 
In Billops v Magness Construction Co., the Hilton Hotel and others26 (a case concerning assault and 
defamation), an American appeal court again found a franchisor vicariously liable to an injured third party for the 
wrongful acts of the franchisee. The appeal court found that the terms of the agreement between the franchisor and 
franchisee were so detailed as to amount to the subordination of the franchisee to the will of the franchisor 
analogous to a master and servant relationship. The court focused on the contents of the Operations Manual of the 
franchise. This manual regulated very many aspects of the daily operations of the franchisee's business. It dictated 
the franchisee's front office procedures, and its cleaning and inspection service for guests' rooms and for public 
areas of the hotel. It set the minimum guest- room standard, as well as the food purchasing and preparation 
standards. It determined the level of "brand name" stock the franchisee should hold and the Manual laid down the 
franchisee's staff and accounting procedures. The Operations Manual also dictated the level of insurance cover the 
franchisee should have. 
Furthermore, to ensure that these prescriptive rules were followed, the franchisee was required to keep 
detailed compliance records for the franchisor's inspection. In addition, the franchisor had the contractual right to 
enter the franchisee's hotel, "to inspect the hotel so as to maintain the high standards and reputation of the system, 
the goodwill of the public, and compliance with the provisions of this Agreement [the franchise contract] and the 
Operations Manual" (Klein & Ramseyer, 1997: 40). Although there were other terms in the agreement which 
granted the franchisee some business discretion, such as the power to hire and fire hotel staff, the appeal court took 
the view that the franchisor was, in reality, exercising day-to-day operational control over the franchisee's 
business. This made the franchisor vicariously liable for the wrongs of the Brandywine Hilton Hotel. 
                                                          
25 148 Tex 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949) 
26  391 A. 2d 196 (Del. Sup. 1978) 
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There are other American cases that similarly focus the extent of the operational and managerial control 
exercised by the franchisor over the franchisee's business as the basis for allocating liability. Thus, in Dorsic v 
Kirtin (1971)27, it was held that the franchisor's interference with the operational running of the franchisee's 
business, particularly by setting the business's hours of work made the franchisor liable to third parties. In Drexel v 
Union Prescription Centres (1978) 28 the detailed operations manual setting the methods of conducting business, 
including the level of inventory to be carried put the franchisor in a position analogous to a master and therefore 
made the franchisor vicariously liable. 
In conclusion, when the American courts have used the master and servant analogy to decide whether or 
not the franchisor is to be held vicariously liable to an injured third party for the wrongs committed by the 
franchisee, the criterion of control has been crucial. It is only when the degree of control extends into the day-to-
day managerial and operational functions of the franchisee’s business will the franchisor be held to be vicariously 
liable. It is submitted that a similar approach may be adopted in Britain29.  
 
7. Is there scope to minimise the potential legal risks? 
 
The problem for the franchisor in applying a reputation risk management system is that it involves extending its 
control over its franchisees to reduce risks. The greater the degree of the franchisor’s control over the network, the 
more likely it is that the franchisor will be held vicariously liable for the franchisees’ torts. However, it could be 
argued that if the risk management system is implemented and enforced correctly, it can actually reduce tort risk. 
If foreseeable hazards are identified and eliminated by risk management, the causes of many legal actions against 
the franchisee and the franchisor are thereby removed (although a low probability, but high impact wrong may still 
cause trouble for the franchised business).  
The main issue facing franchisors is how to ensure the effectiveness of the risk management system within 
the federated structure of the franchise. The franchisees, as semi-autonomous businesses, may resent the extension 
of control by the franchisor over how they run their franchised outlets, particularly with regards to the costs and 
procedures associated with risk management systems. As a possible consequence, some of the franchisees may not 
fully cooperate with the franchisor. They may perform their risk reduction duties in a perfunctory fashion, so that 
there is the real probability of errors going undetected, which may give rise to legal liability later. To address this 
problem the franchisor may have to increase the monitoring of the franchisees and be more willing to take 
disciplinary action against reluctant or recalcitrant franchisees. But that would increase the costs of the franchisor 
and make its vicarious liability for any subsequent wrongs all the more likely. 
 
7.1 The possible use of a management services company 
 
One of the most promising methods by which the franchisor could attempt to introduce reputation risk 
management, and at the same time reduce the risk of vicarious liability, is to use a management services company 
to provide the risk management systems. The franchisor could contract with an existing company that offers these 
services or it could set up its own services company as a subsidiary company. This option offers the franchisor a 
number of potential advantages. The management services company could hire risk management experts to 
identify and quantify risks, spread best practice on risk control throughout the franchised network and monitor 
compliance with the rules designed to avoid or minimise risks. The management services company would 
therefore be able to exercise the control necessary to implement and enforce the risk management system and as a 
separate legal entity in law it would isolate the franchisor from the risks of vicarious liability (Adams v Cape 
Industries plc)30 .  
However, there are two problems with this option. The franchisor would incur additional costs either by 
setting up such a company and paying for its services, or by contracting with an independent management services 
company for such risk management services. But this may be acceptable and a price worth paying if it protects the 
brand, which is the franchisor’s most valuable asset. The second problem may be more serious. By creating or 
engaging a separate company to manage risks through external intervention, the employees of the franchisor and 
the franchisees may not see risk reduction as being a core part of their own activities. These employees may regard 
                                                          
27  96 Cal Rptr 528 (1971)   
28 582 F.2d 781 (1978) 
29 There is an interesting British case that might be of relevance. Hitchcock v Post Office [1980] ICR 100. In this 
case a shopkeeper running his own business had a contract with the Post Office to run a sub-post office from his 
premises. The Post Office exerted control over the security and financial aspects of the sub post office. Was this 
degree of control enough to make the Post Office the "master" and the shopkeeper, the "servant"? In this case the 
answer was, no. The managerial and operational functions of the business still remained with the shopkeeper. This 
fact confirmed that he was an independent contractor. 
30 [1991] 1 All ER 929 
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risk reduction as the responsibility of the service company’s personnel and may not internalise the need to avoid or 





Reputation risk management can help to protect the brand, which is the most valuable asset of the franchisor’s 
business. Risk management can also reduce legal risk of legal eliminating the most probable causes of legal 
liability. For these reasons it will be worthwhile for franchisors to introduce reputation risk management systems.  
 However, there are problems with such systems. In order to make the risk management system work 
effectively, the franchisor may have to increase its control over its franchisees. This may be resented and resisted 
and there is a danger that the system may be difficult to implement effectively in practice. Nonetheless, any 
attempt to increase control over the network (whether such attempts are efficacious or not) carries another type of 
risk for the franchisors. Increased franchisor control may make it easier for tort victims of the franchisees to 
establish vicarious liability on the part of the franchisors in those cases where there has been a failure to manage a 
particular set of risks. 
It has been suggested that transferring the responsibility of reputation risk management to a management 
services company may reduce this legal risk. The services company would generally isolate the franchisor from 
the risk of vicarious liability. Whilst there may be organisational and managerial problems with such a strategy, it 
is still a promising one for franchisors to adopt.  
 
 
 
